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Abstract 
The multiple external shocks experienced by the Egyptian economy are analyzed using a 
series of conterfactuals for income, consumption, savings, investment, wages and prices. 
The public sector's use of the windfall (equivalent to $53 billion in net present value 
terms). was misguided, with little public savings and a variety of policies that forced 
adjustment into parallel markets. Meanwhile, the private sector consumed and invested 
as well as exploited opportunities for rent-seeking that were created by the government's 
control regime. However, the prival sector also accumulated assets abroad which served 




Multiple Trade Shocks and Partial Liberalization: 
The Egyptian Experience 
Table of Contents 
Page 
1. Introduction . 1 
2. The Nature of the Trade Shock 1 
3. Consumption and Savings Behavior 5 
4. The Government Budget 7 
5. Aggregate Capital Formation 9 
5.1 Public Investment 10 
5.2 Private Investment 10 
6. Labor Movements and Wages 12 
7. The Goods Market: Did Relative Prices Change" 14 
8. The Control Regime 15 
8.1 Foreign Exchange Controls 15 
8.2 The Financial System 16 
8.3 The Trade Regime 18 
9. The Control Regime and the Windfall 19 















Terms of Trade Index 
Net Foreign Asset Position 
Capital Flight 
Composition of Government Investment 
Real Government and Private Investment 
Sectoral Private Investment Shares 
• . 25 
• . 26 
27 
28 
• . 29 
30 
• . 32 
• . 33 
34 
• . 35 
36 









* Original sources for all tables and figures are given, 
counterfactuals were constructed by the Author. 
— 11 — 
Multiple Trade Shocks and Partial Liberalization: 
The Egyptian Experience 
Tables and Figures* 
Magnitude of Trade Shocks - Levels and Growth Rates 
Taxonomy of Shocks 
Magnitude of the Oil Shock 
Actual and Counterfactual Consumption and Savings 
Actual and Counterfactual Foreign Savings 
Summary of Government Budget 
Actual and Counterfactual Debt 
Counterfactual Output and Capital Formation 
Sectoral Private Investment as a Share of Total Private Investment 
Sectoral Labor Force as a Share of Total Labor 



















but all derivations and 
Multiple Trade Shocks and Partial 
The Egyptian Experience 
1. Introduction 
To understand the economic consequences of the Egyptian foreign exchange 
windfall it is necessary to disentangle the effects of multiple trade shocks that coincided with a 
partial liberalization program. Egypt experienced a number of different trade shocks during the 
late 1 970s, each of which had its own characteristics. Moreover, after many years of public 
sector-led import substitution industrialization, the Egyptian government launched an effort to 
revive private investment in the economy in 1974. This was accompanied by a series of reforms 
that affected exchange rate regulations, the financial system, and the trade regime. This 
liberalization program, the "infitah" or "open door policy," was not in response to the windfall 
income; in fact, many of the reforms preceded the windfall. But the evolution of the reform 
effort did respond to the changing external circumstances associated with the boom. 
The analysis that follows will evaluate the economic implications of these changes in the 
control regime in the presence of a foreign exchange windfall. Section 2 analyses the nature of 
the trade shock and the state of expectations for the different sources of growth in national 
income. The consequences for consumption and savings behavior are discussed in Section 3 and 
the effects on the government budget are the subject of Section 4. Section 5 considers the 
consequences of the trade shock for aggregate capital formation in both the public and private 
sectors. The implications for the labor market are analyzed in Section 6 and the evolution of 
relative prices in the goods market is presented in Section 7. Section 8 describes the control 
regime -- foreign exchange controls, the financial system and trade policy. Section 9 considers 
the overall impact of the control regime on the ability of agents to adjust to the windfall. Some 
general conclusions are presented in Section 10. 
2. The Nature of the Trade Shock 
The foreign exchange bonanza experienced by Egypt was caused by the 
combination of a sharp increase in petroleum prices and an increase in production volumes during 
the 1970's. Although Egypt had been producing oil on a small scale for decades, the country did 
not become a net oil exporter until 1977.1 Egypt's terms of trade improved somewhat after the 
first oil shock in 1973, but there was no significant windfall until after 1975 when export 
volumes had increased (Figure 1). In 1976, revenues from oil exports rose by 123%. Production 
volumes doubled in the late 11 970s with new discoveries and the return of the Sinai fields after 
the signing of the peace treaty with Israel. Oil export volumes increased by 56% in 1975, 42% 
in 1976, 26% in 1977 and 17% in 1978. Production increased fairly steadily between 1979-84 
at a rate of about 9% per year. This quantity shock after 1975 was compounded by the price 
shock in 1979. Thus the increase in transitory income was delayed. The windfall associated 
with oil accrued largely to the government since domestic private sector activity was limited to 
providing services to the petroleum industry. 
In addition to the oil windfall, the economy experienced a number of other shocks 
during the same period. The most important one was the remittances of migrant labor working 
in the oil exporting countries of the Middle East. As with petroleum exports, Egyptian labor had 
been migrating to the Gulf for decades, albeit in considerably smaller numbers. Demand for 
Egyptian migrant labor increased sharply in the 1970s fueled by the oil boom and higher wages. 
Although no comprehensive figures on the number of migrants from Egypt are available for the 
entire period, estimates are that the numbers rose from 100,000 in the early I 970s to over 1 
million in the early 1980s, and to possibly double that amount by the late 1980s.2 This massive 
emigration represented between 5-10% of the labor force. Most of the demand was for labor in 
the nontradables sectors of the oil exporting countries, particularly construction and services.3 
The tradability of Egyptian labor was facilitated by a number of policy changes. 
Emigration was made a constitutional right in 1971. Exit visas were abolished in 1973 and 
replaced by travel permits available at one's place of work. The issuing of passports was also 
decentralized so that they could be, in principle, obtained at any police station within 24 hours. 
Remitting earnings abroad back to Egypt was made more attractive with the establishment of the 
"own exchange" market which effectively legalized the parallel market for the private sector. In 
addition, the state exempted migrants from paying taxes on income earned abroad and abolished 
.1] Oil seepages were discovered near the mouth of the Gulf of Suez in early Roman times, but the first significant 
modern discoveries were not made until 1909. Despite these early discoveries oil development in Egypt lagged 
behind that in the more well-endowed Gulf countries. lkram, 1980 
2/ The available estimates vary, but all show an upward trend over the 1970's and early 1980's. Fergany's estimate 
based on survey data is that there were not more than 200,000 migrant laborers in 1976. This rose to 1.2 million in 
1985. Fergany, 1988 cited in Assaad and Commander, 1990. Amin and Awney estimate that as many as one 
million Egyptians were working abroad in the early 1980's which constituted between 9-10% of the labor force. 
Amin and Awney, 1985. Commander reports that approximately 5% of the labor force was abroad in the mid- 
1970s and 9-10% by 1981/2. Commander, 1987, p. 125. 
Serageldin, Socknat, Birks, Li and Sinclair, 1983. 
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a law requiring migrants to transfer a minimum of 10 percent of earnings to Egypt at the official 
exchange rate.4 The volume of the resulting remittance income was large (see Table 1), 
sometimes exceeding revenues from petroleum exports, and ranged from 22-43% of the total 
export earnings. Moreover, because remittances are both in cash and in kind, the officially 
reported amounts are generally considered to be underestimates. 
Besides oil and remittances, the reopening of the Suez Canal after the 1973 war 
provided the government a steady supply of foreign exchange that amounted to approximately 
10% of total export earnings. The signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979 ushered in a 
period of sustained high aid flows from the United States as well as increased political stability 
that encouraged tourism. However, this increase in U.S. aid partly replaced Arab aid of a similar 
magnitude that was cut off after the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in Therefore, 
on a net basis the effect was probably neutral with increased aid from the U.S. offset by the fall 
in Arab aid. There was an analogous effect with tourism as tourists from the United States and 
Europe supplanting those from traditional sources like the Arab countries and Eastern Europe. 
Again, on a net .basis, the effect was probably neutral during the 1 980s. The fluctuations 
observed in tourism revenue also reflected political events in the region, with sharp declines in 
periods of regional conflict. 
Table 2 presents a taxonomy of the different shocks experienced by the Egyptian 
economy providing a disaggregation in terms of whether the public or private sectors were the 
primary beneficiaries and the duration of the windfall gain for individual agents and for society 
as a whole. 
The oil price shock of 1973 had insignificant effects on the economy since export 
volumes were low. The quantity shock associated with oil occurred after 1975 when volumes 
increased. The price shock of 1979, which coincided with the higher volumes resulted in a 134% 
increase in export revenues. The increase in revenues from higher production levels stabilized 
by the mid-1980's. Given knowledge about reserves and the extent of exploration, the increase 
in foreign exchange revenues associated with the quantity shock was perceived as temporary.6 
This was exacerbated by the rapid increase of domestic demand because of subsidized energy 
prices and rising incomes. Agents in Egypt could observe the declining world price during the 
I 980s which signaled the end of the world oil price boom. Therefore, precluding the possibility 
of major new discoveries of petroleum reserves, the international signals were fairly clear that 
4/ Ibrahim, 1982, P. 49. 
van den Boogaerde, 1990. 
For example, Dervis, Martin and van Wijnbergen, 1984 writing in the early 1980s were concerned about 
intertemporal choices about growth given finite nonrenewalbe resources. The Egyptian governments own plans 
reflected its awareness of limited oil reserves and the need for future diversification. 
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the price boom in the oil market was on the wane and that Egypt's windfall was a temporary one. 
The government's strategy was clearly one of exploiting oil resources as rapidly as possible to 
finance diversification of the economy, particularly toward industry. 
Remittances are linked to the oil price through the demand for labor in the oil 
exporting countries. However, remittance income has tended to be more stable than the price of 
oil because of structural labor shortages in the Gulf. Thus, in terms of aggregate income, the 
increase in remittance flows represented an upward shift in permanent income. For the individual 
migrant, however, the remittances were a temporary increase in income which would usually be 
used to finance major purchases (such as housing) or for investment (in land or a business). An 
analysis of migrant spending of remittance income based on household survey data found that 
54% was spent on housing and 21 % on land.7 Except for the poorest migrants, the share of 
remittance income devoted to consumption was fairly low (about 32%). Migrants in the top 20% 
income quintile devoted over 80% of marginal budget shares to investment. Thus, income from 
tradable labor was spent largely on investments in non-tradable assets. While the migrant's use 
of remittance income reflected his/her perception of its temporariness, society as a whole 
experienced an increase in permanent income. 
The increase in foreign exchange earnings from aid, the Suez Canal and tourism 
can be considered Egypt's "peace dividend". These were revenues which were permanent as long 
as there was no war between Israel and Egypt and relative stability in the region. Barring any 
major political changes, agents would probably assume that these increased revenues represented 
a rise in permanent income. 
The above discussion implies that the only truly temporary shock experienced by 
the Egyptian economy was that associated with oil. This oil windfall was determined by both 
quantity and price effects. The magnitude of this shock is analyzed in Table 3 where the effects 
of the price and quantity shocks are disaggregated. The oil production figures reflect only the 
Egyptian share, not that of foreign partners. Egypt's total oil reserves are estimated to be about 
600 million metric tons which, if depleted at the rate of 44 million metric tons per year, would 
last until the year 2000. 
The price shock counterfactual is constructed assuming that the price and volume 
of oil production were maintained at 1974 real values and levels and that the collapse of the oil 
market in 1986 did not occur. Real net oil income was derived using an import price index and 
the present value of the oil revenue and calculated using a 10% discount rate. The present value 
2/ Adams, 1991. Adams used household survey data to explore differences in migrant and non-migrant expenditure 
patterns. He estimates counterfactual income and expenditure of migrant households econometrically and then 
compares the actual levels with those of non-migrant households. His results provide strong evidence against the 
view that migrants consume the bulk of their remittance income. 
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of the oil price shock is $34 billion, more that double Egypt's GDP of $15 billion in 1977 when 
it became a net oil exporter. 
The quantity shock is based on the assumption that production 
volumes in 1974 were maintained. Increases in production volumes above the level of 7.5 
million metric tons annually are defined as the quantity shock. The real revenue that resulted 
from the quantity shock and the net present value are presented in Table 3. The net present value 
of the quantity shock is $18.9 billion, which is one and one-quarter times Egypt's GDP in 1977. 
The quantity shock was particularly important between 1976-8 when volumes were increasing 
rapidly and prices were relatively stable, but after the 1979 price increase most of the windfall 
came from the oil price shock, the net present value of which amounted to $34.1 billion. The 
total windfall to the Egyptian economy was about $53 billion in net present value terms. About 
two-thirds of the windfall could be attributed to the price shock and one-third could be attributed 
to the effects of increased production volumes (figure 2). 
The price and quantity shocks estimated in Table 3 were used to explore various 
counterfactuals. Actual income was defined as real GDP in 1980 prices plus the price windfall 
from Table 3. Counterfactual income was defined as real GDP in 1980 prices minus the export 
volume effect in Table 3. This counterfactual level of income was that which could be 
considered "permanent" had the temporary oil windfall not occurred. The resulting estimates of 
income appear in Table 4. 
3. Consumption and Savings Behavior 
To understand the impact of the windfall on the economy, actual and 
counterfactual estimates of consumption and savings are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Actual 
savings rates rose after 1974, reflecting the effects of the quantity shock associated with increased 
oil export volumes. While there is no major increase in savings rates associated with the 1979 
oil price shock, saving rates were markedly higher between 1975 - 1986 compared to other 
periods. This implies that savings rates were responding to a temporary, albeit long, windfall that 
began with an oil quantity shock in 1975, was reinforced by an oil price shock in 1979 and 
subsided with the oil price collapse in 1986. 
Counterfactual consumption was calculated on the assumption that consumption 
and savings rates for the public and private sectors remained at 1975 levels. The resulting 
counterfactual levels were calculated as a share of counterfactual income. Windfall private and 
public consumption were calculated as the difference between the counterfactual and actual 
levels of consumption. The results in Table 4 indicate that both the private and public sectors 
saved a substantial portion of the windfall. This may reflect the fairly high levels of consumption 
in the year chosen for the counterfactual -- aggregate savings was only 7% of GDP in 1975. But 
the savings rate in the previous years, 1971-73, were similar, ranging between 6-8 percent. The 
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public sector dissaved briefly after the initial quantity shock in 1975 and 1976, but saved 
increasingly thereafter. Counterfactual public consumption was actually higher than actual 
consumption for much of the windfall period, implying that the public sector did save some of 
the windfall. The private sector saved substantially after 1974, despite the fact that it was the 
public sector that was the direct beneficiary from the oil windfall. Private savings rates subsided 
in the early 1980s, but recovered in the second half of the 1980s. 
Counterfactual foreign savings are presented in Table 5 based on the assumption 
that the current account deficit remained at 5% of counterfactual GDP over the period. Five 
percent was the average current account deficit as a share of actual GDP for the 1970-73 period. 
Windfall foreign dissavings are calculated as the difference between the actual current account 
deficit and the counterfactual current account deficit. The data indicate substantial foreign 
dissavings during the windfall period, with the exception of 1974 and 1976. Egypt drew on 
foreign savings particularly heavily during the end of the 1980s. The windfall made it possible 
for Egypt to run a current account deficit that was on average two to three times the norm. 
This accelerated foreign dissavings reflected the increased perceived 
creditworthiness of Egypt, possibly based on the perception that the windfall would persist, and 
growth in often politically-motivated official credits. Egypt's experience is broadly consistent 
with the view that creditors tend to lend procyclically, rather than counter-cyclically. Instead 
of saving the windfall income abroad, Egypt accumulated a substantial foreign debt of 
approximately $50 billion by 1988.8 However, unlike other heavily indebted countries, Egypt 
borrowed largely from official creditors and often on very concessionary terms. Eighty percent 
of Egypt's long-term debt was owed to official creditors, mainly bilateral, and the average 
maturity of Egypt's total loans between 1980-85 was 25 years at an average interest rate of 7.5 
percent. 
The foreign dissavings that occurred during the windfall largely reflected the 
activities of the public sector. Very few private sector agents in Egypt are in a position to 
borrow on international capital markets. However, the Egyptian private sector is known to have 
substantial foreign asset holdings abroad. Reliable estimates of the size of these asset holdings 
are not available. The net foreign asset position of the public and private sectors in Egypt based 
on data from the IMF's International Financial Statistics are presented in Figure 3. The graph 
confirms that the private sector tended to accumulate foreign assets after the windfall while the 
public sector maintained a negative net foreign asset position throughout the period. Data 
available on cross border bank deposits of non-banks resident in Egypt are available after 1981. 
These indicate the degree to which agents accumulated foreign assets during the windfall and 
.ai Roughly half of this accumulated debt has since been forgiven by Egypt's creditors though the Paris Club. 
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began to draw down foreign assets when the oil price fell in An additional crude proxy 
of private foreign assets is net errors and omissions in the balance of payments, depicted in 
Figure 4, along with U.S. liabilities to Egypt. Here too, the evidence points to increased foreign 
asset holding by the private sector during the windfall period. Thus, the private sector was better 
able to smooth the windfall income over time by accumulating foreign assets. 
The way in which private agents saved domestically changed dramatically over 
the period. Private agents were permitted to hold foreign exchange accounts in Egypt under Law 
64/1974 and Law 97/1976. As a result of these changes associated with the open door policy, 
there was a shift in asset holding out of Egyptian pounds and into foreign exchange, largely U.S. 
dollars which were held abroad by the domestic banking system. Private foreign exchange 
deposits held in the domestic banking system grew by over 50% per annum on average between 
1978-82. The resulting "dollarization" of the economy served to shift investment 
intertemporally)° This was in response to the higher returns to foreign assets in the context of 
low, often negative, real interest rates on savings held in Egyptian pounds, rising world interest 
rates, growing domestic inflation, a depreciating parallel exchange rate, and uncertainty." By 
the mid-l980s, foreign exchange deposits accounted for 40% of total liquidity.'2 Deposits in LE 
also grew, although at a much slower pace, despite the negative real interest rates.'3 This shift 
in favor of assets denominated in foreign exchange meant that the monetary authorities' control 
over domestic liquidity was reduced, tax revenue capacity was weakened, and the efficacy of 
exchange rate policy was diminished. 
4. The Government Budget 
Egypt is a classic "high absorbing" country with limited oil reserves and a rapidly 
growing population. Thus it is not surprising that the government's propensity to spend its 
windfall income was high, especially after decades of being subject to a foreign exchange 
constraint. Table 6 presents the actual and counterfactual government budget for the period 
1974-87. The counterfactual assumes that the pattern of revenues and expenditures as a share 
IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
10/ For a more detailed analysis of the portfolio aspects of Dutch disease in Egypt, see De Macedo, 1982. 
11/ El-Erians econometric analysis shows that the most important determinants of currency substitution in Egypt over 
the 1979-86 period were expectations of exchange rate depreciation and political uncertainty. El-Erian, 1988. 
12/ El-Erian, 1988. 
J3../ Foda explained this growth of deposits in domestic currency as resulting from the expansion in the money supply, 
the increased use of banks by the public, the tax exempt status of deposits, and the shortage of readily accessible 
alternative investments. Foda, 1982, p. 23. 
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of GDP in 1974 prevailed throughout the period. The resulting counterfactual budget was 
constructed by applying 1974 government budget shares to counterfactual income. The windfall 
to the government budget is derived as the difference between the actual and the counterfactual 
budget. Table 6 gives an indication of the magnitude of the windfall to the government budget. 
For much of the 1 980s, the windfall almost doubled the government's revenues and expenditures 
when compared to the counterfactual. Over the entire period, the government tended to not only 
spend its entire windfall, but to over-spend it. Deficits continued to be substantial over the entire 
windfall period. 
The major source of windfall revenue was oil, which was reflected in the public 
sector surplus. Other important sources of government revenue during the boom were trade taxes 
in the years 1974-1979, which increased with higher levels of importation under the more liberal 
trade regime, and increasing business profits, which grew with the re-emergence of the private 
sector after the introduction of the open door policy in 1974. 
While the government's windfall revenue came largely from tradables, its 
expenditure was on both tradables and nontradables. By the early 1980's, when windfall revenues 
were substantial, government expenditure on investment was the most rapidly growing part of 
the budget. The largest share of this public investment (about half) went to the public sector 
industry, much of which was protected and oriented toward the domestic market. Thereafter, the 
most important area for public investment was infrastructure--particularly transport and 
communication, electricity and, to a lesser extent, housing (see Figure 4). 
The government's wage bill did not increase by a large amount, despite the fact 
that about one-third of the labor force is nominally employed in the public sector as a result of 
the government's policy of guaranteeing employment for all graduates. The absence of a further 
increase in government employment was a reflection of the low and declining real wages paid 
by the public sector and increased employment opportunities in the private sector. 
The consumer subsidy bill also absorbed a large proportion of the windfall revenue 
from 1980/81 to 1981/82. Almost half of this subsidy bill went to cover the costs of maintaining 
artificially low domestic prices for imported wheat and flour. In addition, domestic energy prices 
for most consumers were a fraction of world prices during the period and represented a loss of 
potential export revenues to the public sector.'4 By the end of the windfall period, current 
expenditures became more important as some of the subsidies were phased out. Investment, 
however, continued to absorb a large portion of windfall revenues. 
The resulting government deficit was largely financed domestically through the 
banking system and through the social security surplus. The government was able to avoid rapid 
14/ Domestic petroleum prices in Egypt averaged one-third of the world price during the windfall period. The 
exception to this was private sector firms established under the investment promotion legislation, Law 43, who were 
required to pay world prices for their energy to offset preferential treatment on taxes, customs, duties, etc. 
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inflation by accumulating arrears, exploiting, money illusion among savers and sacrificing the 
enforceability of foreign exchange controls.'5 Egyptian savers continued to hold domestic assets, 
despite their negative real returns because of restrictions on immediate conversion of Egyptian 
pounds into U.s. dollars, some risk associated with the parallel market owing to periodic 
crackdowns on foreign exchange dealers, high transactions and insurance costs associated with 
holding other types of assets (like gold or real estate). There was also some apparent money 
illusion over the period, in part perhaps, because of poor information and the lack of access to 
the formal financial system of some parts of society. 
The debt accumulated by the public sector is depicted in Table 7. A counterfactual 
has been constructed on the assumption that the government's debt as a share of counterfactual 
GDP remained at its 1974 level of 65 percent. The resulting debt associated with the windfall 
was substantial and rose steadily over the boom period. Roughly one-half of Egypt's accumulated 
debt over the period was associated with the windfall. This pattern of debt accumulation only 
partly reflected the increase in perceived creditworthiness of Egypt in the eyes of foreign 
creditors. Since Egypt's debt was owed largely to official creditors, decisions about lending were 
often politically motivated. 
5. Capital Formation 
How much of the windfall was invested? Figure 5 depicts capital formation as 
a share of GDP in the public and private sectors over the windfall period. Although the public 
sector remained the primary investor in the economy, both the private and public sectors 
experienced considerable growth during the windfall period. This was especially the case 
between 1982-84, when the aggregate investment rate was 30 percent. With the collapse in the 
price of oil in 1986, however, private investment virtually ceased, although the government was 
able to maintain public capital formation above 20 percent through continued borrowing. 
The investment attributable to the windfall is presented in Table 8. Counterfactual 
investment was derived as the sum of counterfactual domestic savings (from Table 4) and 
counterfactual foreign dissavings (from Table 5). The final column, which shows the investment 
associated with the windfall, gives an indication of how important the boom was for capital 
formation in the economy during this period. Relative to the "normal" levels of investment, the 
foreign exchange windfall enabled an increase in capital formation of often several orders of 
magnitude. For much of the first half of the 1980s, the windfall enabled a doubling, and in some 
years, a tripling of the normal rate of investment in the economy. 
For a detailed analysis, see Giugale and Dinh, 1990. 
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5.1 Public Investment 
The distribution of public investment across economic sectors is depicted in Figure 
6. Much of the public investment that did occur went toward the rebuilding of Egypt's decaying 
infrastructure. The social returns to this infrastructure investment, although difficult to quantify, 
appear to have been fairly high. Egypt's infrastructure had been neglected for decades and there 
is some econometric evidence that it had significant crowding in effects on private investment.16 
This crowding in of private investment as a result of public investment in infrastructure was 
accompanied by crowding out in financial markets where government borrowing resulted in 
rationing of private borrowers. Public investment in infrastructure also fueled inflation of 
nontradeable prices, particularly of land and construction, for all agents in the economy. 
Public investment in tradables, largely agriculture and petroleum, did not grow 
substantially. However, capital formation in non-financial public enterprises did increase. 
Because the activities of these public enterprises was highly protected, their output is largely 
nontradable. Unlike the investment in infrastructure where the economic returns may have been 
high, the returns from these public enterprise investments were very mixed. Some, such as the 
petroleum companies, were profitable, but many public industries generated negative economic 
rates of return.'7 Estimates by the World Bank for the period 1973-1983/84 indicate the marginal 
productivity of capital in public sector industry was approximately 5%, the ICOR was 19 and the 
total factor productivity change was only 1 •37%•18 
5.2 Private Investment 
The recovery of private investment after 1974 depicted in Figure 5 was partly in 
response to the liberalization and investment incentives associated with the open door strategy, 
but was also strongly motivated by increased demand associated with the foreign exchange boom. 
Although the rate of private investment in Egypt appears fairly low compared to industrial 
countries, it is about average for low and middle income countries where private investment's 
share of GDP is around 10%. Moreover, in Egypt's case, it is important to consider the historical 
context in which all medium and large scale private sector firms were nationalized during the 
1960's. Also, the official statistics for private investment tend to underestimate capital formation 
in the small holding agricultural and informal sectors because of measurement problems. 
Therefore, in terms of other developing countries and in Egypt's own historical terms, the 
recovery of private investment was significant. 
Shafik, 1992. 
UI Hansen, 1988. 
World Bank, 1987, pp. 24-26. 
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Data on the sectoral disaggregation of private investment as a share of total private 
investment is available up to 1982 because of a special report prepared for Parliament in 1985. 
The figures, reported in Table 9 provide insights into the relative profitability of different 
economic activities. Table 9 excludes the booming petroleum sector, which absorbed a large 
share of total private investment as a result of investments in services to the oil industry after 
1974. The first column shows not much change in the sectoral share of agriculture except for 
a sharp rise in 1981-82 which probably reflects growing private investment in capital intensive 
land reclamation projects in response to government incentives. However, aggregate data on 
private investment in agriculture are likely to be unreliable in an economy where most of the 
agricultural sector is based on small peasant holdings. Within the agricultural sector, there was 
a shift away from tradables, such as cotton and rice, toward nontradables, particularly to the 
import-substituting, protected livestock sector and to goods produced for home consumption.'9 
The sectoral share of industry rose from an all time low of 1 % of total private investment in 
1968 in the wake of the nationalizations to an all time high of 42% in 1980. 
Private investment in housing as a share of the total experienced an enormous 
decline - from absorbing 50% of total private investment in 1974 to as little as 9% in 1980. This 
decline in housing investment is in relative, not absolute terms. In fact, the level of private 
investment in housing grew considerably based on censuses from 1976 and 1986. The 
desirability of investment in housing was caused in part by government policies, in particular 
rising inflation and government subsidies to building materials and housing loans.20 
The figures for private investment in construction give some indication of the 
boom in construction activity with the infitah. In addition to increased private demand for 
construction, the boom was fueled by government contracting of large scale projects, largely in 
infrastructure, to the private sector. Prior to the open door policy, the private sector was 
restricted to small scale projects, while large contracts were awarded exclusively to public sector 
construction companies. 
To evaluate the behavior of private investment more directly in Dutch disease 
terms, the sectors have been aggregated in Figure 7. Agriculture and industry have entered 
Commander, 1987. 
20/ The government's subsidies to the housing sector were intended to address the perceived housing shortage, but 
actually fueled the construction of housing units that were inflation hedges and would remain empty. During the 
1980-86 period an average of 211.000 new housing units were constructed each year in urban areas. In rural areas 
the annual average was 171,000 per year during the 1975-86 period. Yet, 17% of the urban units and 14.5% of the 
rural units were empty at the end of 1986. This implies that, using a conservative estimate of $5000 per unit, there 
are $9 billion of idle, unproductive assets held in the form of empty housing in the Egyptian economy. Note that 
the fixed rental, pro-tenant laws discouraged the rental of unfurnished units, despite the fact that there is substantial 
unfulfilled demand for housing. These controls meant that the monthly rent for a large flat in Cairo's most 
expensive residential neighborhood can be roughly the same as the cost of two cups of cotlee in a local hotel. 
Handoussa, 1987 provides a useful summary of the evolution of investment in housing. 
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separately as potentially tradable, construction has been disaggregated and the nontraded sector 
consists of transport, finance, housing, and services. Only two observations from the 1980s are 
available so the results must be considered tentative, especially given the lags in the investment 
process.2' The available evidence shows that in the early part of the windfall from 1974-80, the 
agricultural and industrial sectors gained relative to nontradables. However, after 1980 when oil 
revenues became substantial, both agriculture and industry experienced declining shares of private 
investment while non-tradables' share rose sharply. The construction sector experienced some 
increase in its share of private investment from 1977-80, declined in 1981, and was on an upward 
trend thereafter. 
6. Labor Movements and Wages 
In addition to the spending effect that results from a windfall, there is a resource 
movement effect that results from the rising marginal product of labor in the booming sector. 
Assuming that labor is intersectorally mobile, workers are expected to move out of the lagging 
and nontradables sectors into the booming sector. The effect on real wages is indeterminate since 
wage earners consume nontradables. In the case of an oil boom, or any other type of 
enclave-based boom, there is no major effect on labor markets because of the small number of 
fairly skilled laborers needed in the petroleum industry.22 The existence of income from 
remittances also had consequences for labor movements and real wages. 
The growth in employment was substantial during the windfall period, particularly 
in nontradables. Overall labor force growth was 2.4% over the same period.23 Employment in 
the construction sector grew by 9.5% per year between 1973-82, while employment in services 
grew by 4.6%. In the import substituting manufacturing sector, employment grew by 2.9%, 
reflecting the expansion of capital-intensive industry. In contrast, employment in the tradable 
agricultural sector fell by 1.1%, despite an 11% increase in real wages in the sector over the 
period. The excess demand for labor in the agricultural sector was often met by female and child 
labor that was frequently underreported or unreported.24 Much of the male agricultural labor 
shifted to urban construction where wage growth was even greater than that which occurred in 
agriculture. 
21/ Attempts were made to extend the private investment series beyond 1982 by deriving private investment as the 
residual from total and government investment. Because of different categorizations used, it was not possible to 
arrive at a plausible time series. 
22.1 In Egypts case, only 0.2% of the labor force was employed in the petroleum sector. This proportion remained 
constant during the windfall. Shura Council, 1985 and the Ministry of Planning. 
22.1 Assaad and Commander, 1990. 
Commander, 1987. 
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The growth in employment was fueled by the public sector which expanded by 
over 3.5% per annum between 1973-82, providing over half of the net increase in employment.25 
This was not wage-induced, but reflected the policy of guaranteed employment of all graduates 
and the non-pecuniary benefits (such as status, job security, free medical care and privileged 
access to subsidized goods and services) associated with government employment. This growth 
in public employment during the boom effectively served as a mechanism for transferring some 
of the public sector's windfall to private citizens. The demands of public sector employment 
were often minimal, providing substantial scope for second jobs. As the windfall subsided, the 
government was forced to reduce its annual recruitment of graduates from about 110,000 to less 
than 30,000.26This was achieved not by eliminating job guarantees for graduates, but by 
increasing the queuing time prior to appointment to between 5-6 years. Employment in the 
formal private sector, defined as firms with over ten workers, also grew by 4.5%, but still 
constituted only 3% of total employment.27 Open unemployment during the period ranged 
between 3 5% 28 
The sectoral distribution of labor did shift away from tradables and in favor of 
nontradables in response to the windfall, as evidenced by the data in Table 10. The data include 
both public and private formal sector employment, and thus underestimate small-scale and 
informal sector activities. If counterfactual sectoral employment shares were hypothesized to be 
the same as in 1974 (for the sake of consistency with other counterfactuals), the windfall seems 
to have resulted in a clear shift in employment along Dutch disease lines. The most significant 
changes were in agriculture, industry, and services. The steadily declining share of the 
agricultural sector can be explained in part by technology and growing mechanization in 
agriculture over the period. It is difficult to disentangle the secularly declining trend of 
agricultural employment form that associated with the windfall. The evidence from the other 
sectors is perhaps more interesting. The rising labor shares of nontradable industry and services 
are significant and the labor force in the construction sector virtually doubled during the boom. 
Most of the other sectors experienced very little change in their labor share including the 
booming petroleum enclave, where expansion was very capital intensive. 
Table 11 considers the evolution of average wages across sectors for selected years 
using the 1974 as the base year. Not surprisingly, the sector in which wages were growing the 
most rapidly was the booming mining sector. But petroleum employed a very small fraction of 
Handoussa, 1992, p. 5. 
Handoussa, 1992, p. 6. 
21/ Assaad and Commander, 1990, p. 11. 
Assaad and Commander, 1990, p. 12. 
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the labor force -- less than 1 percent -- and did not have many spillover effects on the rest of the 
economy. The only other sectors in which wages consistently rose more rapidly then the index 
of total wages were agriculture and construction. The explanation for the rapid increase in wages 
in hQth the agricultural and construction sectors in Egypt was a petroleum-based construction 
boom. In the case of the construction sector, the boom resulted in an increase in the relative 
price of nontradables, particularly nontradable capital. The domestic construction boom 
associated with the windfall fueled higher prices which were driven in part by rising labor costs, 
which increased fourfold between 1970 and 1980 (Table 12). In the case of agricultural wages, 
the explanation lies in the migration of large numbers of rural laborers to urban construction and, 
perhaps more importantly, to the construction sectors of the neighboring oil exporting countries. 
A recent survey of emigration found that 35.8% of returned migrants during the period 1974-84 
worked in the construction sector while abroad.29 An increasing number of these international 
migrants came from rural areas. In the early 1970s when emigration was largely to Libya, only 
30% of Egyptian migrants were from rural areas. By the late I 980s, when Iraq emerged as a 
major labor importer, over 50% of Egypt's migrants came from rural areas. This increase in rural 
emigration for construction put substantial upward pressure on agricultural wages. 
7. The Goods Market: Did Relative Prices Change? 
A number of price indices for the Egyptian economy are presented in Table 12. 
The indices are labeled according to whether they would be considered tradable or nontradable 
or both. The table also provides official and parallel market exchange rates to give an indication 
of the different prices faced by the public and private sectors. 
An analysis of the price effects of the foreign exchange windfall in Egypt are 
complicated by the existence of widespread subsidies alongside hidden indexation. For example, 
the official index of petroleum and fuel prices in the wholesale price index shows no sign of the 
260% increase in world energy prices in 1973/4 and the 60% increase in 1979/80 because of 
subsidies to domestic consumers of energy. However, private firms established under the 
investment promotion legislation enacted in 1974 were generally required to pay world prices for 
their energy. The index for construction may also be an underestimate since there was a large 
parallel market for cement and other building materials during the period. At times, the parallel 
market price of cement was as high as 225% of the official selling price.30 
Similarly, the housing index, a frequently used proxy for nontradables, displays 
very little movement over the period because rents have been fixed in perpetuity in Egypt since 
2_9J Assaad, 1991 citing results from the Egyptian Emigration Survey carried out in 1985 under the auspices of the 
National Population Council. 
3.Q./ Interview, Suez Cement Company, December 1987. 
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the 1960s. However, the "key money", a one-off illegal payment required before moving into 
a rented dwelling, has risen steadily in response to growing demand for housing. This inflation 
in de facto housing costs caused by rising key money payments is not reflected in the official 
price index for housing. 
The price indices provide strong evidence of Dutch disease and construction boom 
effects during the boom with prices of nontradables, particularly nontradable capital, rising 
relative to tradables. Prices in the construction sector rose faster than any other price in the 
economy. Services prices, also a nontradable, increased relative to the aggregate price level. The 
relative price of tradables, as measured by the import price index and the price of capital goods 
imports, fell relative to the GDP deflator. Figure 8 depicts relative prices of services (non- 
tradable) to all importables and to imports of capital goods. The shift in relative prices in favor 
of non-tradables is apparent during the windfall. 
Evidence on agricultural land prices from survey evidence also reveals the rise in 
nontradable prices in the economy. In a survey of 1000 rural households in three villages in 
Egypt, Adams found that the average price of a feddan of agricultural land increased by 500%, 
from LE 2000 to LE 12,000, between 1980 and This reflected rates of return on 
agricultural land that averaged about 9.5% over the same period. In contrast, rates of return on 
most small farmer crops in Egypt, most of which were tradable, were negative during the 
windfall period.32 These negative rates of return to much of tradable agriculture reflected, among 
other things, the low procurement prices imposed by the government for selected crops. 
8. The Control Regime 
8.1 Exchange Controls 
The foreign exchange regime in Egypt prior to 1987 has been described as one in 
which a number of different "pools" served the foreign exchange needs of different borrowers. 
There were a few, relatively unimportant and highly overvalued exchange rates that were used 
only for accounting purposes on transactions such as barter agreements with the Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. The "Central Bank rate" of LE 0.70 = $1 was used only by the 
government for transactions such as the importation of key commodities, mostly food, which 
were sold to consumers at subsidized prices. The revenue for this government rate came from 
rents that the government extracted from petroleum and cotton exports as well as from Suez 
Canal revenues. The "commercial bank rate" of LE 1.35 = $1 was also essentially a government 
rate which was used to finance lower priority public sector imports with revenues derived from 
tourism and remittances. The parallel market rate, which varied considerably over time, was 
fl/ Adams, 1991, p. 719. 
3.2.! Adams, 1986. 
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supplied largely by remittances and, to a lesser extent, by tourism revenues not exchanged 
through official channels. 
The existence of a foreign exchange windfall enabled the government to maintain 
unrealistic official exchange rates for a prolonged period. Over time, however, the parallel 
market became increasingly legal as the government instituted policies to attract migrant 
remittances back to the country. The parallel market was officially recognized in 1973 when the 
government created a legal free market for certain imports. By the mid-1970s, a greater number 
of transactions were permitted through the parallel market, thereby achieving an effective 
depreciation. The private sector was permitted to import though the "own exchange" system 
established in 1974/5. Egyptians were permitted to hold foreign currency accounts under Law 
97 of 1976, and to engage in foreign exchange transactions. 
Subsequent policies attempted to restrict the parallel market as the government 
experienced foreign exchange shortages in the mid-1980s. These attempts, which included 
various import bans and restrictions on private foreign exchange accounts, were fairly unsucessful 
at reducing the foreign exchange contraint. By May 1987, some public sector transactions were 
also conducted at the parallel market exchange rate after an exchange rate reform that was agreed 
upon with the International Monetary Fund. Subsequent reforms have effectively unified the 
exchange rate at the parallel market price. 
8.2 The Financial System 
Between the nationalizations and the end of 1974 there were four public sector 
commercial banks, two specialized public sector banks, and two offshore banks. After the 1974 
liberalization, there were 43 commercial banks, 31 business and investment banks, 21 specialized 
and 2 offshore banks by 1 The plethora of financial institutions was in response to the 
growing needs of the private sector and, perhaps more importantly, to the highly profitable 
structure for banking services provided by the Central Bank's schedule of fees and commissions. 
The schedule was originally designed to protect the profitability of the public sector commercial 
banks that would, in theory, lend on the basis of developmental rather than profitability 
objectives. However, the government managed the public sector banks on a more or less 
commercial basis since their inception. Because profitability became an important criterion in 
evaluating the performance of the public sector banks, there is no evidence that they distributed 
loans in any more or less socially desirable way than do the private banks. With the infitah, 
33..! For a survey of the evolution and operations of the banking system, see Foda, 1985. 
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private banks could take advantage of the approximately 6% margin over their cost of funds 
allowed for by the Central Bank's regulations.34 
Egypt, like many developing countries, used Central Bank administered interest 
rates that are below market levels for loans in domestic currency.35 Real rates of interest on 
domestic loans were negative throughout the windfall period. Loans in foreign currency are at 
world market rates.36 Not surprisingly, this spawned considerable arbitrage since private agents 
preferred holding LE denominated debt to that in foreign currencies while they prefer assets 
denominated in foreign exchange over LE. 
Subsidized interest rates for agricultural and industrial loans were intended to 
encourage investment in these sectors. In practice, these especially low rates meant that banks, 
both public and private, preferred making loans to the more lucrative commercial sector rather 
than to higher risk projects in agriculture or industry. While a 6% margin is generous for "safe" 
lending such as short term trade transactions, banks would require much higher returns to embark 
on the kinds of long-term investments in manufacturing that the government sought to encourage. 
Thus, the government's interest rate policy had the effect of discouraging investment in tradable 
agriculture and industry in favor of commercial transactions. 
In addition to financing trade, the banks were heavily involved in exporting capital 
abroad. A report of the Central Auditing Authority found that only 42% of total Law 43 bank 
deposits were invested in local projects; the remainder were held with correspondent banks 
abroad.37 This was made possible by the financial liberalization that was brought about by the 
government's interest in attracting the foreign exchange earnings of migrant workers. Through 
Laws 64/1974 and 97/1976, the government permitted the holding of foreign exchange 
domestically and facilitated transfers from abroad through "free accounts for non-residents" 
available through bank branches located near large concentrations of migrant workers.38 Egyptian 
migrants were also encouraged to subscribe to special bond issues on favorable terms.39 These 
foreign exchange accounts were also made available to domestic residents through both the public 
This is in contrast to the approximately 2% margin for banks in most developed countries on loans to regular 
clients. 
.15/ The government has committed itself to liberalizing interest rates in 1991. 
The interest rate on loans in foreign exchange reflects international prices. Most institutions lend foreign exchange 
at approximately 2% over 6 month LIBOR for the short- and medium-term. 
3JL/ Note that the public sector banks also tended to hold their foreign exchange holdings abroad. Waterbury, 1983, pp. 
149-150. Foda also found that banks in Egypt were net placers of assets abroad, implying a fair degree of liquidity 
in foreign exchange. Foda, 1982, p. 6. 
See IMF, 1990, pp. 142-143. 
Serageldin et al. 1983. 
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and private sector banks. Thus, the structure of interest rates and financial regulations served to 
discourage investment in potentially tradable agriculture and industry. However, the expansion 
of the financial system and the possibility of holding foreign exchange accounts encouraged 
savings, particularly foreign savings, because of the low returns offered on domestic assets. 
During the mid-I 980s, new financial institutions emerged that sought to circumvent 
the Central Bank's low administered interest rates on domestic assets. These were so-called 
Islamic financial funds which operated like venture capital firms or mutual funds, paying 
depositors on the basis of the profitability of their portfolio, rather than with a fixed rate of 
interest. These funds were unregulated and uninsured, but were able to mobilize substantial 
savings with exceptionally high rates of return, ranging from 20-40%. Many savers began 
shifting their domestic assets away from the formal banking system toward the Islamic funds. 
The Islamic funds played an important role in buying foreign exchange from 
migrant workers and in holding domestic assets accumulated during the windfall. Although no 
balance sheets were published, it was widely believed that their investments were concentrated 
in currency speculation, gold, real estate and a small number of industrial projects. As the size 
of their holdings grew (some estimated their total assets were valued as high as $5 billion), the 
government became increasingly concerned about their activities. In 1988, reporting requirements 
and a regulatory structure were imposed on the Islamic funds, triggering numerous bankruptcies. 
This episode in parallel financial markets resulted in massive losses for depositors, many of 
which were small savers. But is also caused a major change in the expectations of Egyptian 
savers and investors. 
8.3 The Trade Regime 
The import regime in Egypt was liberalized substantially after the launching of the 
open door policy. The private sector import licensing system was abolished in 1975 and a 
negative import list of 28 commodities was established in its place. In 1977 this was modified 
with the introduction of an open general licensing system. Reductions in import duties and a 
broadening of exemption from duties was instituted in 1980. The increased openness of the 
economy was reflected in the growth of imports from about one-quarter of GDP in the early 
1970s to about one-half of GDP in the early l980s. Exports also grew, from 15% of GDP in 
1972/3 to 44% by the late 1 970s; however, this largely reflected gains in the petroleum sector. 
Although the trade regime was fairly liberal during the windfall period, the 
industrial sector could still get protection through tariffs and quotas, often on an ad hoc basis. 
This was facilitated by an amendment to Law 43/1974 that allowed investments that produced 
import substitutes to reap the gains of the incentives and subsidies under the infitah legislation 
originally intended exclusively for export-oriented activities. Many private investors obtained 
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guarantees of quantity controls as preconditions to their investing.40 These factors, combined 
with the entrepreneurial learning, growing confidence and the lags inherent in the investment 
process, meant that by the early 1 980s, private investors began to shift from importing 
commodities to domestic production of import substitutes under protection.4' In general, the 
private sector tended to invest in those areas where tariffs were high or where there were quantity 
restrictions on imports - such as construction materials, luxury goods, clothing, engineering and 
assembly operations. 
In the Egyptian case, the protection to industry was not instituted specifically in 
response to the foreign exchange windfall, but had existed since the 1960s as part of the 
government's encouragement of import substitution. Within the industrial sector, there existed 
a tremendous range of effective protection across industries and between individual firms. A 
World Bank study of domestic resource costs and effective protection in 1983 found that private 
sector firms within the same industrial sector had effective rates of protection that ranged from 
negative to highly positive values.42 In general, the study found that food products had negative 
rates of effective protection while textiles, metals and engineering and building materials showed 
positive rates of protection in ascending order. However, there was considerable variation in 
domestic resource costs within industries and between individual firms within an industrial sector. 
The availability of protective tariffs for the industrial sector became particularly 
useful when the combined effects of the foreign exchange windfall and the infitah facilitated 
greater investment in both the public and private sectors by affecting demand, costs and mark 
ups. Interestingly, the effective protection given to the private sector was higher than that for 
the public sector, reflecting the private sector's ability to set its output prices at the levels implied 
by the structure of tariffs. By the mid-1980s the government began to revert to a more restrictive 
trade regime -- a negative import list was reinstated and an "Import Rationalization Committee" 
was established. These restrictions on imports were in large part a response to the slowdown in 
the foreign exchange windfall. 
9. The Control Regime and the Windfall 
The previous analysis provides strong evidence on the existence of Dutch disease 
and construction boom effects in Egypt. Relative price movements indicate a rise in the price 
of nontradables relative to tradables and they show an increase in the price of nontradable capital 
goods relative to other prices during the windfall period. This is evident in both the data on 
jQ./ See Shafik, 1992. 
41/ Shafik, 1989 provides a number of examples of firms that made this transition from importing to domestic 
production under protection. 
42/ World Bank, 1983. 
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output prices and on wages. The movement of capital and labor also indicate fairly classic Dutch 
disease effects with the nontradable sectors gaining relative to tradables. The construction sector 
experienced some of the most extreihe shifts -- with a doubling of investment and employment 
alongside a fourfold increase in prices. There also emerged a parallel market for construction 
materials and a widespread deterioration in building standards to save on costs. 
While the real economy largely followed the pattern identified by construction 
boom theory, the control regime sometimes served to suppress these effects. Specifically, the 
rise in the price of the booming sector was offset by substantial domestic energy subsidies. The 
decline in the price of tradables was counteracted by the granting of protection to the industrial 
sector, which became a de facto nontradable. The rise in the price of nontradables such as 
housing was constrained by the policy of fixed rents. The boom in construction prices was 
restrained by government subsidies in the form of credit and inputs to respond to a perceived 
shortage of housing and infrastructure. 
Some of these policies existed prior to the windfall and were not a part of a 
concerted effort by the government to avoid relative price changes during a temporary boom. 
The initial motives behind the liberalization of the control regime was not the foreign exchange 
windfall. However, the existence of a foreign exchange boom provided momentum and a new 
rationale for the reform process. For example, the opportunity cost of the subsidy required to 
maintain domestic energy prices at artificially low levels increased in proportion to the rise in 
world oil prices during in the l970s. The increased demand for housing was manifested in rapid 
growth in the amount of 'key money' required to occupy a fixed rent dwelling. In rural areas, 
land prices rose rapidly as returning migrants sought to translate their temporary windfalls into 
fixed assets. The number of firms interested in taking advantage of the availability of protection 
for industrial investments increased substantially. And an open financial system became more 
important when the economy had to smooth windfall income intertemporally. In general, the 
control regime was better at repressing construction boom effects when the activity was 
exclusively in public hands, such as energy pricing and the trade regime. Where the private 
sector played an important role, such as in housing, construction, and in foreign exchange and 
financial services, demand spilled over into parallel markets. 
Just as the boom facilitated an economic opening, the bust resulted in efforts to 
restrict imports, control foreign exchange markets and restore government price controls. Parallel 
markets -- in goods, foreign exchange and financial services -- were repressed. These recidivist 
tendencies made it more difficult for the economy to manage the downside of the windfall. 
10. Conclusions 
Unlike foreign exchange booms that are concentrated in one particular sector, the 
windfall in Egypt affected the economy through a variety of channels and its consequences were 
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the result of the actions of both private and public agents over a fairly long period of time. The 
public sector's use of the oil windfall implied a perception that the shock was a permanent one. 
There was little public sector savings, although there was an increase in public investment, some 
of which was financed by borrowing. The returns to this increase in public investment were 
mixed. Some of the windfall was also used to sustain a growing subsidy bill from artificially 
low prices for certain foodstuffs and energy and to maintain an overvalued official exchange rate. 
Private sector consumers were the major beneficiaries of the subsidy program, although the public 
sector also consumed subsidized energy; the public sector was the sole beneficiary of the 
overvalued exchange rate. In general, the government was not very successful at shifting the 
boom intertemporally nor at investing the windfall income optimally. 
The private sector increased both its consumption and its investment during the 
windfall period. High consumption levels in part reflected the permanent nature of some of the 
windfall for the private sector. However, individual migrant laborers experiencing a temporary 
windfall did have a higher propensity to invest their remittance income than did non-migrant 
households. Private capital formation rose rapidly in response to the combination of the windfall 
and investment incentives. Private firms also took advantage of the government's willingness to 
provide protection for rent-seeking purposes. Private production decisions reflected a shift in 
favor of using tradable inputs to make nontradable outputs. This was in response to the 
extremely profitable opportunities offered under the open door policy's incentive structure and 
served to concentrate the boom, especially in terms of the demand for non-tradable capital goods. 
Although the relative size of the private sector did expand as a result of this protection, the firms 
that evolved were uncompetitive by international standards. Nevertheless, unlike the public 
sector, the private sector did save some of its windfall income, particularly in the form of foreign 
assets. This was made possible by the changes in the control regime adopted by the government 
to attract the foreign exchange earnings of migrant workers. This was the one area in which 
the policy response to the shock contributed to improved management of the temporary foreign 
exchange windfall. 
These private savings, most of which were held in foreign exchange, helped to 
shift the boom intertemporally. What was damned as "unnationalistic capital flight" in the 1970s 
and 1980s, may be a major hope for investment financing during the 1990s. What will be crucial 
will be the creation of an incentive structure that encourages the repatriation of capital into 
investment in tradable activities. 
- 21 - 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, R., "The Economic Uses and Impact of International Remittances in Rural Egypt," 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Volume 39, Number 4, July 1991. 
Adams, R. Development and Social Change in Rural Egypt, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1986. 
Amin, G. and E. Awny, "International Migration of Egyptian Labor," IDRC Report MR 108c, 
May 1985. 
Assaad, R., "Structure of Egypt's Construction Labor Market and its Deveopment Since the mid- 
1 970s," in Employment and Structural Adjustment -- Egypt in the 1 990s, edited 
by H. Handoussa and G. Potter, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1991. 
Assaad, R. and S. Commander, "Egypt: The Labor Market through Boom and Recession," 
mimeograph, World Bank, May 1990. 
Central Authority for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Statistical Yearbook, Cairo, 
various issues. 
Commander, S.J., The State and Agricultural Development in Egypt Since 1973, London: Ithaca 
Press, 1987. 
Corden, M., "Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation," Oxford 
Economic Papers, 1984. 
deMacedo, J.B., "Currency Diversification and Export Competitiveness: A Model of the Dutch 
Disease in Egypt, "Journal of Development Economic, Ii, 1982, pp. 287-306. 
Dervis, K., R. Martin and S. van Wijnbergen, "Policy Analysis of Shadow Pricing, Foreign 
Borrowing and Resource Extraction in Egypt," World Bank Staff Working paper Number 622, 
1984. 
- 22 - 
El-Erian, M. "Currency Substitution in Egypt and the Yemen Arab Republic: A Comparative 
Quantitative Analysis," IMF Staff Papers, volume 35, number 1, March 1988. 
Fergany, N., "In Pursuit of Livelihood: A Field Study of Egyptian Migration," Centre for Arab 
Unity Studies, Beirut, 1988 (in Arabic). 
Foda, A.S., "Banking Sector Survey," mimeograph, report to the United States Agency for 
International Development, Cairo, June 1982. 
Giugale, M. and H. Dinh, "Money, Inflation and Deficit in Egypt," PRE Working Paper 553, 
World Bank, Washington, December 1990. 
Handoussa, H., "The Impact of Foreign Aid on Egypt's Economic Development: 1952-1986," 
paper presented to a conference on "Aid, Capital Flows and Development," Taillories, France, 
September 1987. 
Handoussa, H. "Crisis and Challenge - Prospects for the 1990's," in H. Handoussa and G. Potter, 
editors, Employment and Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990s, Cairo: American 
University in Cairo Press, 1992. 
Hansen, B., The Political Economy of Poverty. Equity and Growth: Egypt, unpublished 
manuscript, March 1988. 
Ibrahim, S. in Kerr, M. and S. El-Yassin, editors, Rich and Poor States in the Middle East, 
Boulder & Colorado: Westview Press and American University in Cairo, 1982. 
Ikram, K., Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition, Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1980. 
IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Annual Report, Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1990. 
Neary, J.P., "Non-traded Goods and the Balance of Trade in a Neo-Keynesian Temporary 
Equilibrium, 'Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1980. 
Neary, J.P. and S. van Wijnbergen, Natural Resources and the Macroeconomy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986. 
- 23 - 
Penwell Publishing Company, Energy Statistics Sourcebook, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1988. 
Serageldin, I., J. Socknat, Stace Bob Li and C. Sinclair, Manpower and International Labor 
Migration in the Middle East and North Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Shafik, N. "Private Investment and Public Policy in Egypt:, DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 
1989. 
Shafik, N., "Modelling Private Investment in Egypt," Journal of Development Economics, 
(forthcoming), 1992. 
Shura Council, "Investment Policy," mimeograph, Financial and Economic Affairs Committee 
Report, 1985 (in Arabic). 
van Wijnbergen, S., "Inflation, Employment, and the Dutch Disease in Oil-Exporting Countries: 
A Short-Run Disequilibrium Analysis," quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1984. 
van den Boogaerde, P., "The Composition and Distribution of Financial Assistance from Arab 
Countries and Arab Regional Institutions," IMF Working Paper No. 67, July 1990. 
World Bank, "Arab Republic of Egypt: Issues of Trade Strategy and Investment Planning," 
mimeograph, December 1983. 
World Bank, World Tables 1989-90, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1990. 
World Bank, World Debt Tables 1989-90, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1990. 
Zaytoun, M., "Earnings and the Cost of Living: An Analysis of Recent Developments in the 
Egyptian Economy." in Employment and Structural Adjustment -- Egypt in the I 990s, edited 
by H. Handoussa and G. Potter, Cairo: American University Press, 1991. 
- 24 - 
TABLE 1 
Table I: - )Iagnftude of Trade Shocks - LeveLs and Growth Rates 
(In of US DoLLars) 
Shock 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
CU 187 289 644 720 802 1878 3179 3329 2807 2957 
Growth Rate 0.55 1.23 0.12 0.11 1.34 0.69 0.05 -0.16 0.05 
189 366 755 897 1761 2445 2555 1935 3165 3931 
Growth Rate 0.94 1.06 0.19 0.96 0.39 0.17 0.32 0.64 0.24 
AId 140 361 598 931 1202 997 1402 1464 1172 1428 
Growth Rate 1.58 0.66 0.56 0.29 -0.17 0.41 0.06 -0.20 0.22 
Suez CanaL 0 85 311 428 514 589 780 909 957 974 
Growth Rate 2.66 0.38 0.20 0.15 0.32 0.17 0.05 0.02 
Toorfsm 265 332 464 728 702 601 712 611 304 288 
Growth Rate 0.25 0.40 0.57 -0.04 -0.14 0.18 -0.14 -0.50 -0.05 
Rates: 
Oft export revenues onLy refLect Egypt's share, not that of foreIgn ccaTpanfes. 
The category saId" refLects officIaL Loans and grants. 
Source: WorLd Bank 
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TABLE 2 
Table 2: Eqypt: Taxonomy of Shocks 
Expected Duration 
Shock Beneficiary Individual Society 
Oil-Quantity Public Temporary Tamporary 
(1975) 
Oil-Price Public Temporary Temporary 
(1979) 
Remittances Private Temporary Permanent 
(1979) 
Aid (1979) Public Permanent Permanent 
Suez Canal Public Permanent Permanent 
(1975) 
Tourism (1979) Public/Private Permanent Permanent 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Egypt — Actual and Counterfactual Consumption 
and Savings (in real 1980 LE) 
Actual 
Counterfactua 1 
Notes: Net public savings have been 
receipts minus current expenditures 
payments and subsidies). 




Consumption Savings Actual 
As a Share of GDP GOP Sharelncome 




















1974 7157 1985 0.79 0.22 —0.02 9948 
1975 6558 2583 0.67 0.26 0.07 10808 
1976 6782 2753 0.63 0.26 0.11 11867 
1977 8157 2427 0.68 0.20 0.12 13269 
1978 8505 2621 0.66 0.20 0.14 14137 
1979 10167 2424 0.71 0.17 0.12 16475 
1980 11411 2585 0.72 0.16 0.11 20406 
1981 11577 3131 0.71 0.19 0.10 22389 
1982 12303 3059 0.67 0.17 0.16 24095 
1983 12800 3368 0.66 0.17 0.17 25023 
1984 13764 3747 0.66 0.18 0.16 26714 
1985 14693 3795 0.66 0.17 0.17 28223 
1986 15127 3822 0.68 0.17 0.15 28451 









• factual Private Public Private Public 
Income Consuinpt Consurnpt Consuinpt Consumpt 
1974 9006 6034 2341 1123 —356 564 —701 
1975 9295 6227 2417 331 166 583 122 
1976 9518 6377 2475 405 278 587 615 
1977 10314 6911 2682 1246 —255 633 786 
1978 11118 7449 2891 1056 —270 696 1145 
1979 12507 8380 3252 1787 —828 720 937 
1980 13949 9346 3627 2065 —1042 650 1094 
1981 14323 9597 3724 1980 —593 581 1081 
1982 15908 10658 4136 1645 —1077 704 218]. 
1983 16880 113.10 4389 1490 —1021 796 2549 
1984 17640 11819 4587 1945 —840 816 2397 
1985 18889 12656 4911 2037 —1116 900 2798 
1986 18933 12685 4923 2442 —1101 895 2464 
1987 19798 13265 5148 2214 —1415 956 3005 




calculated as current 
(includihg interest 
- 28 - 
TABLE 5 
Table 5: Egypt — Actual and Counterfactual Foreign Savings 
(LE millions) 
Actual Counterf actual 
Current As a Current Windfall 
Account Share of Account Foreign 
Deficit GDP Deficit Dissavings 
1974 161 0.02 450 —289 
1975 662 0.07 465 198 
1976 329 0.03 476 —147 
1977 612 0.05 516 96 
1978 706 0.05 556 150 
1979 1290 0.09 625 665 
1980 1022 0.06 697 325 
1981 1537 0.09 716 821 
1982 2516 0.14 795 1720 
1983 1441 0.07 844 597 
1984 2119 0.10 882 1237 
1985 3421 0.15 944 2477 
1986 5007 0.22 947 4060 
1987 3706 0.16 990 2716 
1988 2970 0.12 1021 1949 
Source: World Bank and author's calculations. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TabLe 7: Egypt — Actual and Counterfactual. Debt 
(itt nominal terms) 
Actual Counterfactual 
Public Private Public Debt! Public Windfall 
Lorzg—term Debt Couriterf act Debt Debt 
Debt Income 
1974 2969 107 .0.70 2751 0 
1975 4958 107 1.05 3081 1877 
1976 - 6120 126 1.13 3526 2594 
1977 8720 149 1.34 4224 4496 
1978 11040 154 1.42 5059 5981 
1979 12996 252 1.22 6910 6086 
1980 . 16767 322 1.20 9067 7700 
1981 20322 367 1.40 9403 10919 
1982 23716 557 1.36 11374 12342 
1983 26308 733 1.31 13057 1325]. 
1984 28534 696 1.23 15135 13399 
1985 32927 1037 1.21 17680 15247 
1986 36042 1263 1.18 19937 16105 
Source: World Bank and author's calculations. 
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TABLE 8 





Current As a 
Account Share of 
Deficit GDP 
Source: World Bank data and author's calculations 
- 33 - 
Savings Investment As a 
Share of 
GDP 
1974 —180 —0.02 161 0.02 —19 0.00 
1975 706 0.07 662 0.07 1368 0.14 
1976 . 1202 0.11 329 0.03 1531 0.14 
1977 1419 
1842 
0.12 612 0.05 2031 0.17 
1978 0.14 706 0.05 2548 0.20 
1979 1656 0.12 1290 0.09 2946 0.21 
1980 1744 0.11 1022 0.06 2767 0.18 
1981 1662 0.10 1537 0.09 3199 0.20 
1982 2885 0.16 2516 0.14 5401 0.30 
1983 3345 0.17 1441 0.07 0.25 
1984 3213 0.16 2119 0.10 5331 0.26 
1985 3697 0.17 3421 0.15 7119 0.32 
1986 3359 0.15 5007 0.22 8366 0.38 
1987 396]. 0.17 3706 0.16 7667 0.33 











1974 564 —701 450 —289 1014 -990 
1975 583 122 465 198 1048 320 
1976 587 615 476 —147 1063 468 
1977 633 786 516 96 1149 882 
1978 696 1145 556 150 1252 1295 
1979 720 937 625 665 1345 1602 
1980 650 1064 697 325 1347 1389 
1981 581 1081 716 821 1297 1902 
1982 704 2181 795 1720 1499 3901 
1983 796 2549 844 597 1640 3.146 
1984 816 2397 882 1237 1698 3634 
1985 900 2798 944 2477 1844 5275 
1986 895 2464 947 4060 1842 6524 
1987 956 3005 990 2716 1946 5721 
1988 999 4401 1021 1949 2020 6350 
TABLE 9 
: SECTORAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF TOTAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT, 1974-82 
lIAR AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY CONSTRUCTION FINANCE TRANSPORT SERVICES 
1974 0.08 0.19 0.50 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.08 
1975 0.05 0.24 0.43 0.0]. 0.0]. 0.24 0.02 
1976 0.04 0.35 0.27 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.21 
1977 0.09 0.36 0.24 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.20 
1978 0.07 0.36 0.19 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.19 
1979 0.09 0.38 0..22 0.12 0.0]. 0.07 0.12 
1980 0.09 0.42 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.21 
1981 0.24 0.24 0.36 0.0]. 0.01 0.04 0.09 
1982 0.16 0.20 0.49 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 
NOTE: NUMBERS NOT SUM TO 1.00 IN ANY PARTICULAR YEAR BECAUSE OF ROUNDING OF FIGURES. 
SOURCE: SEURA COUNCIL, 1985. 
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TABLE 10 
Table 10 : Egypt: Sectoral Labour Force as a Share of Total Labour Force, 1974 - 88 














0.12 0.02 0.03 
0.12 0.01 0.05 
0.12 0.01 0.05 
0.12 0.01 0.05 
0,13 0.01 0.05 
0.13 0.01 0.06 
0.12 0.01 0.06 
0.13 0,02 0.06 
0.14 0.02 0.04 
0.15 0.02 0.03 
0.14 0.02 0.05 













0.005 0.10 0.04 0.22 
0.005 0.10 0.04 0.22 
0.006 0.11 0.04 0.23 
0.006 0.11 0.04 0.24 
0.006 0.11 0.04 0.24 
0.006 0.11 0.04 0.24 
0.006 0.12 0.04 0.26 
0.006 0.11 0.04 0.28 
0.006 0.10 0.05 0.26 
0.006 0.10 0.05 0.27 
0.006 0.10 0.04 0.27 
0.006 0.10 0.04 0.27 
Note: After 1981/82, Data on the Labour Force in the Petroleum Sector are Included Under Industry. 
Source: Shura Council 1985, and Ministry of Planning. 
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TABLE 11 
TabLe 11: Egypt — Index of Average Wages by sector, selected years (1970100) 
1970 1975 1977 1982 1984 1985 1987 
Aqriculture 100 136 267 444 630 890 890 
Mining 100 172 284 620 914 780 920 
Manufacturing 100 130 181 445 606 63.7 809 
Construction 3.00 140 191 411 73.8 733 888 
Transport 100 161 174 372 483 593 667 
Finance 100 109 136 323 411 469 605 
Services 3.00 139 167 320 486 510 673 
Total 100 132 184 418 580 620 760 
Source: CAPHAS, 'Emplcymerit, Wages and sours of Work," various issues; cited in 
Zaytoun, 
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TABLEJ2 
Table 12: Egypt — Price Deflators (1974=100) 
GOP Capital Other Construction Housing 
(LE officialGoods Services 
Imports(LE) 
(TINT) (T) (T) (NT) (NT) (NT) 
1974 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1975 110 76 114 112 156 100 
1976 124 73 121 113 186 99 
1977 137 74 130 133 211 100 
1978 151 84 140 152 235 10]. 
1979 185 100 157 173 267 103 
1980/81 224 120 176 199 320 10]. 
1981/82 244 120 176 233 370 102 
1982/83 264 128 192 244 408 112 
1983/84. 294 133 199 277 433 119 
1984/85 320 140 212 314 473 130 
1985/86 361 172 270 346 515 142 
1986/87 401 219 367 380 543 150 
Note: There is a break in the import price indices in 1980/81 because of 
a change from a calendar to a fiscal year basis. 
Sources: World Bank and CAPI4AS, Statistical Yearbook, various issues; Pick's 
Currency Yearbook, various IMP, International Pinancia]. 
Statistics. 












Egypt: Terms of Trade Index 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1976 1919 1980 1981 1982 1983 1964 1985 
year 
D Terms Trade 
Source: WorId Bank 
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EGYPT: NET FOREIGN ASSET POSITION 
PU8UC AND PRLVATE SECTORS 
YEAR 
C PUBUC + PRrVATE 
Source: IMF, International Fmandal 
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yeor 
Q + industry 0 nontrodobles construction 
Source: Shura Council, 1985. 
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